

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

6 * * *

7 CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,

8 Plaintiff,

9 v.

10 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC,

11 Defendant.
12

Case No. 2:17-cv-03003-KJD-VCF

ORDER

13 Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (#11). Plaintiff
14 filed a response (#12) to which Defendant replied (#16). Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion
15 for Summary Judgment (#14). Defendant filed a response (#17) to which Plaintiff replied (#19).
16 Also before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Relief Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17 56(d) (#18). Plaintiff filed a response (#20) to which Defendant replied (#22).

18 **I. Background**

19 This case emerges from the non-judicial foreclosure sale on or about July 20, 2012 of the
20 property located at 10802 Cape Shore Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89166 ("Property"). This case
21 shares a similar fact pattern with many cases currently pending before this Court, all having to do
22 with HOA foreclosure sales. The several motions presently pending before the Court center in
23 whole or in part around the question of what notice of default the foreclosing party was required
24 to provide Plaintiff prior to its foreclosure sale on the Property. After the Nevada Supreme
25 Court's decision in SFR Investments Pool 1 LLC v. U.S. Bank, the Ninth Circuit decided Bourne
26 Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2016), holding NRS
27 115.3116(2)'s statutory notice scheme was facially unconstitutional. In light of Bourne Valley,
28 what notice an HOA must provide prior to foreclosing on a superpriority lien remains uncertain.

II. Analysis

A. Certified Question

On April 21, 2017, in Bank of New York Mellon v. Star Hills Homeowners Association, this Court certified the following question to the Nevada Supreme Court: “Whether NRS § 116.31168(1)’s incorporation of NRS § 107.090 requires homeowners associations to provide notices of default to banks even when a bank does not request notice?” Bank of New York Mellon v. Star Hill Homeowners Assoc., 2017 WL 1439671, at *5 (D. Nev. April 21, 2017).

In granting certification, the Court reasoned the following: In Bourne Valley, the Ninth Circuit definitively answered the question that the statute’s “opt-in” framework was unconstitutional. Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2016). However, that leaves this Court with the unresolved question of what notice must be provided. “It is solely within the province of the state courts to authoritatively construe state legislation.” Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). As such, state law questions of first impression like this one should be resolved by the state’s highest court. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944). Allowing the Nevada Supreme Court to answer this question before considering any other motions will provide this Court the necessary guidance as to how to handle the issues of notice and actual notice in light of Bourne Valley.

In Bank of New York Mellon, the Court did not and could not rely upon any controlling state law as to the requirements of notice. This Court faces the same predicament here. An answer to the above already certified question will provide much needed clarity, and may be dispositive of many of the issues currently before the Court in this case.

B. Stay of the Case

The pending motions in this case implicate the previously certified question regarding what notice state law requires. To save the parties from the need to invest further resources into the issues surrounding the notice requirement, the Court *sua sponte* stays all proceedings in this case and denies all pending motions without prejudice.

1 A district court has the inherent power to stay cases to control its docket and promote the
2 efficient use of judicial resources. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S., 248, 254-55 (1936);
3 Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 200).
4 When determining whether a stay is appropriate pending the resolution of another case—often
5 called a “Landis stay”—the district court must weigh: (1) the possible damage that may result
6 from a stay; (2) any “hardship or inequity” that a party may suffer if required to go forward; and
7 (3) “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues,
8 proof, and question of law” that a stay will engender. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098,
9 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). Weighing these considerations, the Court finds that a Landis stay is
10 appropriate.

11 *1. Damage from a stay*

12 The only potential damage that may result from a stay is that the parties will have
13 to wait longer for resolution of this case and any motions that they have filed or intend to file in
14 the future. But a delay would also result from any rebriefing or supplemental briefing that may
15 be necessitated pending the Nevada Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question. It is not
16 clear that a stay will ultimately lengthen the life of this case.

17 Additionally, a stay of this case pending resolution of the certified question is
18 expected to be reasonably short. This Court certified the question approximately nine months
19 ago, and briefing on the pending petition in Nevada’s Supreme Court is completed. Because the
20 length of this stay is directly tied to the petition proceedings in that case, it is reasonably brief,
21 and not indefinite. Thus, the Court finds only minimal possible damage that this stay may cause.

22 *2. Hardship and inequity*

23 Both parties equally face hardship or inequity if the Court resolves the claims or
24 issues before the certified question has been resolved. And in the interim, both parties stand to
25 benefit from a stay, regardless of the outcome of the question. A stay will prevent any additional,
26 unnecessary briefing and premature expenditures of time, attorney’s fees, and resources.

27 //

28 //

